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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In these consolidated cases, Leroy S. Wilske appealed from his Judgment of 
Conviction and Sentence in a 2013 case where a jury found him guilty of felony 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and further appealed from his Judgment on Probation Violation and 
Disposition in a 2010 case where the district court revoked his probation for felony DUI. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Wilske asserted that the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied his motion to sever in the 2013 case, that the district court erred when it 
denied his "motion for a partial directed verdict" in the 2013 case, and that the district 
court erred when it found that he had violated his probation in the 2010 case. (App. 
Br., pp.8-19.) 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Wilske did not show that the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to sever in the 2013 case, 
did not show that the district court erred when it denied the "motion for a partial directed 
verdict" in the 2013 case, and did not show that the district court erred in concluding that 
he violated his probation. (Resp. Br., pp.7-23.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's argument that the district 
court did not need to conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis on the motion to sever. ( See 
Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) Contrary to the State's contention, consideration of Rule 404(b) 
was necessary in this case because, upon review of a denial of a motion to sever, the 
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determination of whether the third potential source of prejudice 1 appears in a case 
essentially involves a Rule 404(b) analysis. See State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 
868 (1983). 
The State also argues that, under Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), 
Mr. Wilske cannot show he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction based on the district 
court's denial of his "motion for a partial directed verdict," because the district court was 
not required to remove the alternative charging theories that were not supported by the 
evidence. (See Resp. Br., pp.15-16.) Mr. Wilske concedes that Griffin is controlling 
precedent in this case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceed in s 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Wilske's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 Idaho's appellate courts have identified three potential sources of prejudice which may 
justify the grant of a motion to sever, and the third source is where "the jury may 
conclude that the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other 
because of his criminal disposition." See, e.g., Abel, 104 Idaho at 867-68. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Wilske's motion to 
sever in the 2013 case? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wilske's "motion for a partial directed 
verdict" in the 2013 case? 
3. Did the district court err when it found that Mr. Wilske had violated his probation 
in the 2010 case? 
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ARGUMENT 
L 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Wilske's Motion To Sever 
In The 2013 Case 
Mr. Wilske asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to sever in the 2013 case, because the facts of his trial demonstrate that unfair 
prejudice resulted from the joint trial and he was therefore denied a fair trial. At 
Mr. Wilske's trial, the third potential source of prejudice-the possibility that the jury may 
conclude that he was guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other simply 
because of his criminal disposition, i.e., Mr. Wilske is a bad person-appeared. See 
State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 867-869 {1983). That potential source of prejudice 
appeared because evidence of the misdemeanor charges would not have been 
admissible in a separate trial of the felony DUI charge, as it was not relevant to the 
felony DUI. See id. at 868; I.RE. 404(b). 
When considering the third potential source of prejudice, the Idaho Supreme 
Court, like courts in some other jurisdictions, has "engaged in an analysis of the 
evidence of the separate counts to determine whether, if the counts had been tried 
separately, the separate evidence could have been admitted in evidence in the different 
trials." Abel, 104 Idaho at 868. This essentially involves an Idaho Rule of Evidence 
404(b) analysis. See id. at 869. 
The State argues that the district court was not required to conduct a Rule 404(b) 
analysis of Mr. Wilske's motion to sever pursuant to Abel. (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) 
According to the State, 'That such an analysis is 'useful,' and even dispositive in some 
cases, does not mean it is required." (Resp. Br., p.10 (quoting Abel, 104 Idaho at 865).) 
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However, consideration of Rule 404(b) was necessary in this case, because upon 
review of a denial of a motion to sever, the determination of whether the third potential 
source of prejudice appeared in a case such as Mr. Wi!ske's essentially involves a Rule 
404(b) analysis. See Abel, 104 Idaho at 869. 
The State argues that "since Abel, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that 
'whether evidence would have been admissible absent the joinder is only a factor in 
determining whether a proper joinder is prejudicial."' (Resp. Br., pp.11 (quoting State v. 
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565 n.2 (2007)).) The State's reliance upon Field is misplaced 
because the Field Court was reviewing the propriety of an initial joinder, which comes 
under a different standard than a motion to sever. See Field, 144 Idaho at 564-65. The 
Field Court noted, "Whether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a 
question of !aw, over which this Court exercises free review." Id. at 564. The Field 
Court further held, "In contrast, an abuse of discretion standard is applied when 
reviewing the denial of a motion to sever pursuant to I.C.R. 14; however, that rule 
presumes joinder was proper in the first place." Id. at 564-65. Thus, joinder could be 
proper under Idaho Criminal Rule 8, but nonetheless prejudicial under Idaho Criminal 
Rule 14. See id. 
The Field Court's recognition that "whether evidence would have been 
admissible absent the joinder is only a factor in determining whether a proper joinder is 
prejudicial," was in the context of determining whether the initial joinder was proper, not 
whether the proper joinder was nonetheless prejudicial. See id. As explained above, 
those two different questions come under different standards of review. See id. at 564-
65. The Idaho Supreme Court in Field did not depart from the Abel analysis for 
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determining, upon review of a denial of a motion to sever, whether the third potential 
source of prejudice appeared. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals cases invoked by the State also do not support its 
argument. The State cites State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221 (Ct. App. 2013) (Resp. 
Br., pp.8, 11 ), but Tankovich is inapposite because the potential source of prejudice at 
issue there was the first source, not the third source. The defendant in Tankovich was 
charged with malicious harassment and conspiracy to commit malicious harassment, 
and sought to sever his trial from the trial of two co-conspirators. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 
at 224. The co-conspirators, but not the defendant, had tattoos displaying symbols 
typically associated with white supremacist groups. Id. at 224, 226. The defendant 
asserted "that evidence of one co-conspirator's intent is not relevant to a charge of 
conspiracy against another co-conspirator." Id. at 225. He also asserted "that the tattoo 
evidence was unfairly prejudicial and confusing to the jury, and therefore inadmissible 
under I.R.E. 403 because he did not have any similar tattoos." Id. at 226. The Court 
noted that the defendant's claim of unfair prejudice in support of his motion to sever 
"mirrors his argument regarding the admissibility of the evidence of [the co-
conspirators'] tattoos." Id. at 227. Thus, by raising an issue of jury confusion, the 
defendant in Tankovich brought his motion to sever under the first potential source of 
prejudice, i.e., "the possibility that the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, 
rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated." See Abel, 104 Idaho at 868. 
The Tankovich Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when 
it denied the motion to sever based on the first source, because "the evidence was 
admissible against [the defendant], and he was not unfairly prejudiced by its 
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introduction,'' Tankovich, 155 Idaho at 227. Tellingly, the Court also observed that the 
defendant "has not asserted that the joinder of his trial resulted in any other form of 
prejudice." Id. Thus, Tankovich does not support the State's argument that a Rule 
404(b) analysis is not required when addressing the third potential source of prejudice, 
because that case did not deal with the third source. 
Nor does State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903 (Ct. App. 2013), also cited by the State 
(Resp. Br., pp.8, 11 ), support the State's argument. The Idaho Court of Appeals in 
Eguilior clarified that the defendant brought her motion to sever under the third potential 
source of prejudice. Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 908. The State argues that the Eguilior 
Court "discussed the cross-admissibility of some evidence, [but] it did not conduct a 
404(b) analysis." (Resp. Br., p.10.) However, the Eguilior Court actually held that, 
"Even if the fourth case had been tried separately, evidence and information on the 
marijuana delivery counts likely would have gone before the jury because of its close 
relationship with the marijuana counts in the fourth case." Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 908. 
Thus, the Court suggested that it properly addressed the third source, by "engag[ing] in 
an analysis of the evidence of the separate counts to determine whether, if the counts 
had been tried separately, the separate evidence could have been admitted in evidence 
in the different trials." See Abel, 104 Idaho at 868. 
Further, the cases cited by the Egui/ior Court in reviewing the denial of a motion 
to sever, 137 Idaho at 908, used a Rule 404(b) analysis when addressing the third 
potential source of prejudice. See State v. Cirelli, 115 Idaho 732, 733 (Ct. App. 1989); 
State v. Gooding, 110 Idaho 856, 859 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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Thus, upon review of a denial of a motion to sever, the determination of whether 
the third potential source of prejudice appeared in a case essentially involves a Rule 
404(b) analysis. See Abel, 104 Idaho at 869. The State's argument to the contrary is 
unavailing. Because Mr. Wilske's motion to sever primarily implicated the third possible 
source of prejudice (see Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.7, Ls.21-24), consideration of Rule 404(b) 
was necessary in this case. 
Because the State's remaining arguments regarding the motion to sever are not 
remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Wilske simply refers the 
Court to pages 8-13 of the Appellant's Brief. 
i I. 
The District Court Erred When it Denied Mr. Wilske's "Motion For A Partial Directed 
Verdict" In The 2013 Case 
Mr. Wilske asserted that the district court erred when it denied his "motion for a 
partial directed verdict" in the 2013 case, because substantial evidence did not support 
his conviction for felony DUI under the alternative theories challenged in the motion. 
The State argues that, under Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), "the 
district court was not required to modify the jury instructions to remove those alternative 
charging theories that were not supported by the evidence," and thus Mr. Wilske 
"cannot show he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction." (Resp. Br., pp.15-16.) 
The United States Supreme Court held in Griffin that "if the evidence is 
insufficient to support an alternative legal theory of liability, it would generally be 
preferable for the court to give an instruction removing that theory from the jury's 
consideration. The refusal to do so, however, does not provide an independent basis 
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for reversing an otherwise valid conviction." Griffin, 502 U.S. at 60. Mr. Wilske 
concedes that Griffin is controlling precedent in this case. 
111. 
The District Court Erred When It Found That Mr. Wilske Had Violated His Probation In 
The 2010 Case 
Mindful of State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308 (Ct. App. 2000), Mr. Wilske asserts 
that the district court erred when it found that he had violated his probation in the 201 O 
case. Because the State's argument concerning the probation violation issue is not 
remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Wilske refers the Court to 
pages 18-19 of the Appellant's Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Wilske respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction in the 
2013 case and remand the case to the district court with instruction to sever his 
misdemeanor charges from the felony DUI charge to proceed in separate trials. 
Alternatively, Mr. Wilske respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment on 
probation violation in the 2010 case, and remand the 2010 case to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2015. 
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